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Lattice Studies of Gerrymandering Strategies
By KYLE GATESMAN AND JAMES UNWIN∗
We propose three novel gerrymandering algorithms which incorporate
the spatial distribution of voters with the aim of constructing gerryman-
dered, equal-population, connected districts. Moreover, we develop lat-
tice models of voter distributions, based on analogies to electrostatic po-
tentials, in order to compare different gerrymandering strategies. Due
to the probabilistic population fluctuations inherent to our voter models,
Monte Carlo methods can be applied to the districts constructed via our
gerrymandering algorithms. Through Monte Carlo studies we quantify
the effectiveness of each of our gerrymandering algorithms and we also
argue that gerrymandering strategies which do not include spatial data
lead to (legally prohibited) highly disconnected districts. Of the three
algorithms we propose, two are based on different strategies for packing
opposition voters, and the third is a new approach to algorithmic ger-
rymandering based on genetic algorithms, which automatically guaran-
tees that all districts are connected. Furthermore, we use our lattice
voter model to examine the effectiveness of isoperimetric quotient tests
and our results provide further quantitative support for implementing
compactness tests in real-world political redistricting.
Representative democracies must necessarily group constituents into voting districts
by partitioning larger geographical territories. Gerrymandering is the act of purposely
constructing voting districts which favour a particular electoral outcome. In the United
States the power to draw district lines within a state belongs to the state legislature or
districting commission. Thus, self-interested politicians with this authority could ger-
rymander – manipulate the district lines of their territory – to maximize the electoral
outcome for their own party. Gerrymandering for political gain is morally questionable
as it reduces the power of the electorate, and this practice is not restricted to any politi-
cal party or country. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the Untied States has recently heard
two gerrymandering cases, the first Gill v. Whitford [2018] concerned the 2011 redistrict-
ing plan for Wisconsin due to Republican legislators, and the second Benisek v. Lamone
[2018] was regarding changes made to the boundaries of Maryland’s 6th district by the
Democratic Party. Furthermore, in principle, there are instances in which elaborate re-
districting could be applied with benevolent intent, such as ensuring the proper represen-
tation of minority groups (based on ethnicity, religion, or other identifiers) which are not
spatially localized. Such majority-minority districts have also been the focus of Supreme
Court hearings, e.g. Shaw v. Reno [1993] and Miller v. Johnson [1995].
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Political gerrymanderers aim to maximize the number of districts in which constituents
of an opposing party will assuredly lose the majority vote, thereby minimizing the op-
ponent’s political influence. However, districts are commonly required to conform to
certain general requirements:
• Connectedness: Each district must comprise a single, connected region.
• Uniformity: All districts in a territory must have approximately equal populations.
• Shape: Districts should be generally compact, but legal stipulation is limited.
Figure 1. : Sample 5×5 territory with two
different district allocations.
Despite these requirements, clever re-
districting can have significant conse-
quences. Consider an election involv-
ing two parties, which we label red and
blue, and a territory which can be mod-
elled as a 5× 5 grid. Each of the 25 unit
squares denotes a territorial unit, and its
colour represents the overall party affil-
iation of its voters. For the purpose of
this simple example, we will assume a
uniform population (thus each unit has
equal voting weight) and a voter prefer-
ence such that 60% (40%) of the units
favour red (blue).
Given the split in voter preference, an impartial districting into five districts should be
expected to yield three red-majority districts and two blue-majority districts. However,
as illustrated in Figure 1, it is possible for the blue party to gerrymander the territory
so that it wins three out of the five districts, thereby winning a majority of districts.
Conversely, the red party can construct four red-majority districts instead of three. Thus,
an entity with the power to set the district lines can potentially arrange for whatever
result it desires if unconstrained by other considerations. This illustrates, a simple, but
powerful, gerrymandering strategy in which opposition voters are “packed” into districts
in a manner which wastes the voting power of opposition supporters.
The main pursuit of this work is to construct algorithms which take a distribution of
voters on a lattice and returns a set number of gerrymandered, equal-population, con-
nected (or mostly connected) districts. Lattice studies of redistricting can clearly provide
a great deal of insight, and thus we use our model to quantify some general statements
concerning gerrymandering. In particular we use our lattice population models to com-
pare gerrymandered districts to geometrically constructed ‘fair’ districts and examine
how this changes the net vote in each district and the overall election result, in order to
quantify to what extent gerrymandering is advantageous to the proponent party. More-
over, by applying common measures of gerrymandering to the districts generated via our
algorithm, we are able to provide a quantitative assessment of whether these measures
can detect and potentially constrain gerrymandering.
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An influential paper of Friedman & Holden [2008] systematically explored algorith-
mic approaches of “packing” and “cracking” voters into districts, arriving at the mantra
“sometimes pack, but never crack”, and propose a novel packing procedure for strate-
gically gerrymandering a territory. Despite providing a number of excellent insights,
the gerrymandering algorithm proposed in Friedman & Holden [2008] entirely neglects
the spatial distribution of voters and thus generally leads to highly disconnected voting
districts. In the present paper we develop a lattice model which encodes population dis-
tributions and voter preferences. Using this lattice model we study the spatial profile of
the aggressive gerrymandering strategy outlined in Friedman & Holden [2008] and shall
show that it generally leads to highly disconnected districts.
Specifically, in this work we study four strategies for gerrymandering. The first strat-
egy is an implementation of the Friedman & Holden [2008] method which references a
lattice voter distribution. The latter three strategies are novel algorithmic approaches we
propose here:
• Friedman-Holden (FH) packing (Section II): Districts are formed from the most
partisan voters from both parties, with a bias such that most districts favour the
gerrymander’s party. The algorithm does not required the districts to be connected.
• Spatially Restricted Friedman-Holden (SRFH) packing (Section III.A): The
FH packing strategy is adapted to ensure almost all districts are connected.
• Saturation packing (Section III.B): Opposition voters are packed into a small
number of districts, skewing the partisan bias in the majority of districts.
• Genetic gerrymandering (Section IV): Starting from sets of random districts, we
iteratively mutate these district configurations, in order to maximize some prede-
fined fitness function. Choosing the fitness function appropriately can yield both
fair or gerrymandered sets of districts.
To some extent the algorithms developed here are driven by two competing goals
i) Maximising the number of districts won by the gerrymanders party;
ii) Aiming for connected (or mostly connected) districts.
Indeed, it is a common legal requirement that voting districts are a single connected re-
gion, however, as we show in Section II, the approach of Friedman & Holden [2008]
leads to all districts being highly disconnected. In contradistinction, in the genetic ger-
rymandering algorithm we develop here all districts are guaranteed to be connected, and
in the Saturation and SRFH packing strategies only the final district remains discon-
nected. In the latter case, the final district typically has only a small number of distinct
pieces and connectivity can often be achieved through minor swaps between districts.
Hence, providing a significant improvement on the algorithmic gerrymandering strategy
of Friedman & Holden [2008].
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We note here that there is a sizeable body of existing literature focusing on minimizing,
optimizing, and detecting gerrymandering. In particular, several groups have proposed
methods to construct fair districts, which are population equal and non-partisan (for in-
stance [Sherstyuk, 1998; Altman & McDonald, 2011]), or maximally gerrymandered,
which favour a particular outcome (see e.g. [Sherstyuk, 1998; Friedman & Holden, 2008;
Puppe & Tasnadi, 2009; Apollonioa et al., 2009]. Additionally, several studies have pre-
sented a range of geometric tests or measures, such as voting district compactness and
convexity, to detect gerrymandering, for example [Roeck, 1961; Schwartzberg, 1966;
Oxtoby, 1977; Young, 1988; Niemi et al., 1990; Polsby & Popper, 1991; Chambers &
Miller, 2010; Hodge et al., 2010; Wang, 2016; Giansiracusa, 2017; Duchin, 2018; War-
rington, 2018].
This work is structured as follows: In Section I, we outline a new procedure for gen-
erating lattice models of population and voter distributions. In Section II we outline a
specific model of aggressive gerrymandering, proposed by Friedman & Holden [2008],
and using our lattice models we demonstrate that this leads to disjointed districts. Sub-
sequently, in Section III, we outline two packing algorithms, one of which is based on
similar principles to Friedman and Holden’s approach, and both of which take into ac-
count spatial information regarding voters. In Section IV we present a further algorithmic
gerrymandering strategy based on genetic algorithms, with the distinct advantage that it
automatically outputs connected districts. In Section V we apply our codes to generate
a number of gerrymandered territories, presenting both instructive examples and Monte
Carlo studies which quantify the impacts of gerrymandering. Finally, in Section VI,
we give a summary of results, a discussion of their implications, and suggest potential
directions for subsequent studies. Our Python codes which implement the algorithms
discussed herein are provided online.
I. Modelling Voter Distributions on Lattices
A manner of generating large sets of quasi-random population and voter distributions
can provide a flexible tool for studying the general features of population subdivisions
and gerrymandering. Abstracting away from purely data-driven studies of voter distri-
butions can allow both more general analyses and more specialized studies depending
on how one implements the model. In this section we outline an elegant manner of
constructing models of a voter distribution. Specifically, we propose to study a popu-
lation distribution which is modelled on a binomial distribution (generated by a walker
algorithm), which approximates well a discretized Gaussian distribution with random
fluctuations. Such a quasi-Gaussian distribution is a good model for a city or town in the
absence of natural boundaries (which breaks the spherical symmetry). We then superim-
pose a spread of partisan bias on this population. Whilst the notion of modelling voters
via lattice distributions has been previously explored in applications of statistical physics
to sociopolitical research e.g. [Chou & Li, 2006; Wall, 2008; Castellano et al., 2009], to
our knowledge there are no previous studies which apply lattice techniques to assess the
viability of specific gerrymandering strategies for a given voter distribution.
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A. Lattice Models of Population Distributions
In this sections we shall define the key concepts that will be used throughout the paper,
which concern modelling geographical regions with a population of voters, which we
refer to as territories. In most representative democracies, it is common to split territories
into small indivisible cells called territorial units (such as census units), with each unit
containing a potion of voters. In this work we model territories as lattices:
DEFINITION 1: A territory S is a square lattice in Z2, where each lattice site (i, j)
defines a territorial unit Ti, j carrying a population value Pi, j ∈N and a voter preference
vi, j ∈ (−1,1). The total population of the territory is defined as PS = ∑i, j Pi, j.
We shall call a population distribution on a territory S a set of fixed values for all Pi, j
and call a “voter” (or “partisan”) distribution a set of fixed values for all vi, j. We call S
equipped with a population distribution a “population model” and S equipped with both
a population and voter distribution will be referred to as a “voter model”.
DEFINITION 2: Given a territory S, a district D is a finite union of territorial units,
i.e., D=∪(i, j)∈ITi, j for an index set I. The district population is defined as PD =∑(i, j)∈I Pi, j
and district voter preference is ND = ∑(i, j)∈I vi, j.
In contrast to arbitrary graphs, lattice territories can be efficiently manipulated and are
ideal for our analysis, since the distributions input to our algorithms and the districts out-
put can all be represented as square matrices. Furthermore, the lattice structure provides
intuitive notions of adjacency and connectedness between the territorial units:
DEFINITION 3: Territorial units at Ti, j and Tk,l are said to be adjacent if i= k±1 and
j = l, xor (exclusive or) j = l±1 and i = k.
DEFINITION 4: A territorial unit Ti, j is reachable from Tk,l if there exists a sequence
of adjacent territorial units beginning at Ti, j and ending at Tk,l .
Given the above definitions of adjacent units and reachable units, we can express a simple
notation of district connectedness:
DEFINITION 5: A district D is connected if any Ti, j ∈D is reachable for every Tk,l ∈D.
Since we are interested in cases where the territory is partitioned into a set of equal
population districts, we introduce the following definition:
DEFINITION 6: A valid districting is a set of n disjoint districts {Di} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
such that S = ∪i≤nDi and for fixed t ∈ R one has −t ≤ |Di|− |D j| ≤ t for 1≤ i, j ≤ n.
The quantity n denotes the total number of districts in S. We call t the population
threshold, which allows for small variations in population between districts, whilst re-
quiring approximately equal district populations. Throughout this work we will take
t ∼ 0.01×PS/n, such that differences between districts are percent-level.
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Since it is of interest to consider population distributions which well model real world
situations, here we shall focus on a quasi-Gaussian distribution of population much as
would be appropriate in a large city in which the population is highly dense towards the
centre and becomes diffuse at large radial distances. To approximate a Gaussian popula-
tion spread with random fluctuations, we implement a walker function (see e.g. Shiffman
[2012]) on a m×m lattice with m ∈ Zodd with the central lattice site designated (0,0).
The walker function is essentially a simple agent-based model (see e.g. Macal & North
[2005]) which undergoes time step evolution. In this case an agent is an object associated
to a single lattice site at a given time step and the walker function is a set of probabilistic
rules which determine how the spatial location of agents evolve between time steps. The
agent represents an individual of the population and thus the probabilistic evolution of
agents leads to random fluctuations in the population distribution. We will exploit these
random fluctuations in the population distribution to implement Monte Carlo methods
later in this work.
Figure 2. : Example
population distribution
generated by the walker
algorithm. Colour inten-
sity indicates population
density.
For a given territory S one can construct a popu-
lation model with total population PS via the walker
function, as detailed below. We take a m×m lat-
tice and consider PS agents with the following start-
ing distribution (at time step t = 0)
(1) Pi, j
∣∣
t=0 =
{
PS for (i, j) = (0,0)
0 otherwise
.
Thus, each integer unit of population is associated to
an agent on the lattice and, prior to evolution via the
walker function, the whole population of the territory
is located at the central lattice site.
During each time step an agent can move with
fixed probability to any lattice site adjacent to its cur-
rent location with equal probability, with the restric-
tion that agents remain within the m×m lattice. Each
agent is allocated a fixed number of moves, and move
counts across all agents follow a normal distribution
centred at the minimum number of moves needed to
reach (m,m) from (0,0). Once an agent has taken its
prescribed number of moves, it remains in its termi-
nal unit.
After all agents have taken their prescribed moves the walker function outputs the
number of agents at each lattice site (i, j) and this is identified with the population Pi, j
of the territorial unit Ti, j. The walker function provides a value for Pi, j for each Ti, j ∈ S
and thus defines a population model (but not a voter model, since the vi, j remain unde-
termined at this stage). The population spread due to this algorithm well approximates a
two-dimensional Gaussian distribution; an example is shown in Figure 2.
LATTICE STUDIES OF GERRYMANDERING STRATEGIES 7
B. Modelling Elections on the Lattice
With a working lattice model of population distributions we next introduce a flexible
manner of introducing a voting distribution within the population which shall lead to the
premise of voting and electoral events.
DEFINITION 7: The proponent (opponent) is the party which benefits (loses) from
gerrymandering. A territorial unit Ti, j is a proponent unit if vi, j > 0, an opponent unit if
vi, j < 0, or neutral if vi, j = 0.
Without loss of generality, we let the proponent party corresponds to positive extremity,
i.e. vi, j > 0, and designate this the “red” party. The opponent party we designate the
“blue” party. We assume all voters cast ballots, so vi, j > 0 corresponds to the average
vote in territorial unit Ti, j favouring the proponent. We also assume that the gerrymander
knows the values vi, j with certainty, although this could be relaxed.
DEFINITION 8: The net territory vote (or popular vote) of a territory S is the sum
NS := ∑i, j vi, j. A territory is said to be balanced if NS ≈ 0. For a district D = ∪(i, j)∈ITi, j
in S, the district vote is ND = ∑(i, j)∈I vi, j.
We say that the red party wins the popular vote in S if NS > 0; conversely, blue wins (red
loses) the popular vote if NS < 0. However, rather than the popular vote of the whole
territory, what is typically most important is the district-wise overall vote. Similar to
the popular vote, for n districts, we say that red wins the district vote of district Dk for
1≤ k ≤ n if NDk > 0 and we say blue wins (red loses) the district vote if NDk < 0.
The distinction between the district vote and the popular vote implies that a given party
can lose the latter, while securing the most districts. Typically the most important out-
come is the number of districts won by each party. Thus, gerrymandering fundamentally
exploits the differences between the local and global properties of distributions. Realistic
numbers of districts n in a given territory range from 2 to O(10); for example Hawaii
has only 2 congressional districts, while California has 53. In our later example and
statistical studies we will typically take n = 5.
Since elections are dynamic and inherently uncertain, the gerrymanderer risks losing if
the plan is to win a district by only a single vote. Introducing a vote threshold w ensures
that the gerrymanderer’s party wins a given district with a minimum margin.1 We call a
district “safe” for red if NDk > w, for a fixed prescribed w ∈ Z which is called the vote
threshold (conversely, NDk < −w is safe for blue). We typically take w ∼ 0.01×PS/n,
for n districts, such that safe districts favour the proponent with a margin of at least 1%.
C. Modelling Voter Preference Distribution
In what follows we shall introduce a novel procedure for generating smooth distri-
butions of voter preferences. We implement voter preference in terms of a number of
specified points of peak partisan bias, ‘sources’, with voter preference falling towards
1One could define wk district-by-district, such that the requirement is weaker or stronger depending on the district.
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neutrality away from these peaks. Using an analogy to the theory of electrostatic po-
tentials and inverse power laws, we define sources of partisan bias via the properties of
point charges, as follows.
DEFINITION 9: Given a territory S, a source point is a pair Ei, j = {(i, j),e} charac-
terized by its location (i, j) ∈ S and the magnitude e ∈ R of the source. We require that
any set of source points gives |vi, j| ≤ 1 ∀Ti, j ∈ S.
To match with our previous (arbitrary) assignment that vi, j > 0 corresponds to the red
party, we call Ei, j a red source when e > 0 and a blue source when e < 0. Source points
can be located at arbitrary lattice sites, and the voter preference at a given territorial unit
Ti, j is a function of the distance d from these source points, following a 1/d power law:
DEFINITION 10: The vote contribution ∆k,l from a source by E = {(i, j),e} to the net
vote of territorial unit Tk,l , where (i, j) and (k, l) are separated by distance d(Ti, j,Tk,l) is
(2) ∆k,l =
e
max[1,d(Ti, j,Tk,l)]
,
where the distance function (the metric) is taken to be
(3) d(Ti, j,Tk,l) :=
√
(k− i)2+(l− j)2 .
Given α source points {Eα} for 1 ≤ α ≤ m, whose positions are chosen independently,
we denote their contribution to vi, j as ∆
(α)
i, j and
(4) vi, j =∑
m
∆(m)i, j .
From the above definition the vote contribution from a given source falls linearly with
distance d from the source.2 Because of the 1/d power law, the source points typically
represent local maxima of the voter preference, with sign(e) indicating the favoured
party. In this model, a balanced territory requires at least one blue and one red source, so
we are generally interested in scenarios with two or more sources.
Additionally, we note that in principle two source points could be located at the same
lattice site,
(5) E1 = {(i, j),e1} and E2 = {(i, j),e2} ,
in this case the two sources can always be replaced with a single source:
(6) {E1,E2}↔ E1+2 = {(i, j),(e1+ e2)} .
2In principle one could study other power laws or consider sources each with different d dependencies.
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D. Benchmark Models
Figure 3. : Example
voter distribution for
two source points.
To summarize, given a territory S we use the walker func-
tion of Section I.A to fix the Pi, j values of S and by designating
a set of source points and referring to eq. (4) we fix vi, j values
of S, thus defining a voter model. As an example, we assign
lattice sites immediately left and right of the origin (0,0) to
serve as blue and red source points {EB, ER} with
(7) ER = {(−1,0),1} and EB = {(1,0),−1} .
The combination of the two dimensional quasi-Gaussian pop-
ulation distribution (as in Figure 2) and the sources {EB, ER}
produces the voter distribution shown in Figure 3. The colour
intensity indicates the magnitude of the net voter preference vi, j and the centre of these
coloured regions corresponds to the positions of the two source points.
In subsequent examples and statistical analyses presented throughout the remainder of
this work we shall consider a number of specific benchmark voter models with a quasi-
Gaussian population distribution and particular source point distributions, as given in
Table 1 below:
Model # EB E ′B ER E
′
R
1 ((1,0),−1) - ((−1,0),1) -
2 ((4,0),−1) - ((−4,0),1) -
3 ((6,0),−1) ((0,6),−1) ((−6,0),1) ((0,−6),1)
4 ((6,0),−1) ((−6,0),−1) ((0,6),1) ((0,−6),1)
Table 1—: Models with 2 or 4 source points for territories based on 21× 21 square
lattices. A dash indicates that the source point is not included in a given model.
All of the benchmark models have balanced territorial votes: NS ≈ 0. The voter distribu-
tion of model #1 is illustrated in Figure 3 and models #2- #4 are shown in Figure 4. These
examples show that the method above can implement a variety of voter distributions.
Model #2 Model #3 Model #4
Figure 4. : Visualization of voter distributions for models #2 - #4 of Table 1.
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II. The Friedman-Holden Packing Strategy
There are two fundamental strategies in algorithmic gerrymandering: packing and
cracking. First, a gerrymanderer can dilute the voting power of the opponent party either
by packing the most concentrated opponent-voting subpopulations into a small number
of districts. Second, one can crack the most concentrated opponent population into sev-
eral districts so that the most concentrated or extreme voting base for the opponent party
never gains a majority. A strategic application of voter packing underlies the approach
of Friedman & Holden [2008].
As an the example consider a gerrymanderer that favours the red party and whose goal
is that NDk > 0 in the maximum number of districts Dk for 1≤ k ≤ n in a given territory.
Friedman & Holden [2008] considered a pseudo-normal voter extremity distribution and
generated districts by simply partitioning the bell curve of the population by extremity.
The first district is formed by joining the most extreme subpopulations, i.e., the bell
curve tails, so that i) their combined population is approximately the average district
population, and ii) the right tail is sufficiently larger than the left tail. The latter condition
signifies that the extreme right-party voters are sufficient to override the extreme left-
party vote in their district.
The above process will, in essence, “waste” the opponent’s strongest voting popula-
tion in a district it cannot likely win. This process is repeated on the subsequent districts
and the final district is composed of the remaining population. Thus, by construction,
the later districts are comprised of mostly moderate voters and, for balanced territories,
are typically won by the opponent party. This approach has a number of merits but
suffers from the lack of spatial considerations. The Friedman-Holden method equates to
unrestricted “cherry picking”: the gerrymanderer has the freedom to select scattered pop-
ulation chunks for placement in the same category, as we demonstrate shortly. Notably,
if even a single district is disconnected, the districting plan is typically legally prohibited.
A useful measure of failure, is the number of connected components of each district:
DEFINITION 11: A connected component C ⊆ D of a district D is a (non-empty) set
of territorial units in D such that given a territorial unit Ti, j ∈C, another territorial unit
Tk,l also lies in C if and only if Ti, j is reachable from Tk,l .
A district can be decomposed into its set of connected components Ci and we shall write
D = ∪i≤rCi, where r is the number of connected components. If any territorial unit
in D is reachable from all other territorial units in D, then r = 1 and we say that D is
connected. The number of connected components is important for the analysis of the
spatial distributions arising through the algorithms studied.
A. Implementing Friedman and Holden’s Algorithm on Lattice Territories
Friedman & Holden [2008] outline a packing strategy which ignores the spatial data
of the voter distribution. In order to demonstrate how this strategy leads to highly dis-
connected districts we shall reformulate the strategy of Friedman & Holden [2008] for
generating districts in terms of an algorithmic approach applied to a lattice voter model
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and we will refer to this algorithm as “FH Packing”. Then by neglecting spatial data dur-
ing the redistricting process, but tracking the positions of the territorial units allocated to
each district, we can assess the connectivity of the districts constructed via FH packing.
First, since voting districts are legally required to have comparable populations, we
define a target population PD± to ensure that all districts have approximately equal pop-
ulations. The target population is implemented using the population threshold t (from
Definition 6), the total population PS, and the number of districts n, as follows
(8) PD± := (PS/n± t) .
The value of PD± is computed before the algorithm is executed and each district should
satisfy the following population condition
(9) PD− ≤ PDk ≤ PD+ .
Also, the majority of district should satisfy the district win condition
(10) NDk > w .
Later districts, in particular the final district, must have an opponent bias if the territory
is balanced. Only when the algorithm is satisfied with the composition of a given district
will it proceeds to form the next district, until all n districts are formed.
To implement FH packing strategy on a lattice territory our algorithm iteratively as-
signs single territorial units to a district, one district at a time, such that the end result
favours the proponent. We call a territorial unit unassigned unit if it has not yet been
assigned to a district and denote the set of unassigned units U . As territorial units are as-
signed to districts by the algorithm, they are deleted from U . For a territory S on a m×m
lattice there are initially m2 unassigned territorial units in U and n (empty) districts Dk
for 1≤ k≤ n. We implement the FH packing strategy by first sorting the territorial units
in order of decreasing net vote vi, j, using a quicksort method [Hoare, 1961], and rela-
belling the elements of this ordered set {Tˆ1, Tˆ2, · · · Tˆm2}, such that Tˆ1 corresponds to the
strongest unit vote for the opponent party and Tˆm2 is the strongest unit vote for the propo-
nent. More precisely, the strongest unassigned opponent unit is Ti, j ∈U if vi, j ≤ vk,l for
all Tk,l ∈U , or equivalently it is Tˆβ ∈U if for all other Tˆγ ∈U one has β < γ . Conversely,
Tˆβ for β the largest index in U is the strongest unassigned proponent unit.
Implementing a discretised version of the strategy outlined in Friedman & Holden
[2008], our algorithm forms each district D by iteratively adding the strongest the unas-
signed proponent unit followed by the strongest unassigned opponent units, until PD >
PD− . The algorithm then calculates the district vote NDk and compares it to the vote
threshold w. If NDk > w and PD < PD+ then the district is complete and the algorithm re-
peats this process to create the remaining districts, with the exception of the last district.
It may be that in forming a given district, whilst the district satisfies PD > PD− the
district vote is calculated to be less than the vote threshold. In this case the algorithm
adds the strongest remaining unassigned proponent units until NDk > w, and at each step
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checks that PD < PD+ . Once the district vote is sufficiently large, the district is complete.
When the population limit is exceeded, PD > PD+ , our algorithm will remove the last unit
added and try the next in the ordered list until it identifies an addition to the district that
does not violate the population limit. For large vote thresholds w or small population
thresholds t, this districting algorithm may fail (i.e. no district satisfies simultaneously
eq. (9) and (10)), but this is rarely a problem for percent-level w and t.
Finally, the last district Dn is identified with the remaining unassigned territories af-
ter the first (n− 1) districts are constructed. If the territory is balanced, as we assume,
then it is impossible for all districts to favour the proponent, and thus it is expected that
for the final district NDn < 0. Moreover, by design, the final district is primarily com-
prised of moderate voters. The only requirement on the final district is that it satisfies
PD− ≤ PDn ≤ PD+ and this will commonly be the case for reasonable choices of t. For a
smaller population threshold, and thus a more stringent requirement of population unifor-
mity, the final district may fail the population constraint. In this case, after constructing
the final district the algorithm will make a number of amendments to the district compo-
sitions such that the populations are within the threshold. In the case that PDn > PD+, the
proponent-favouring territorial units on the exterior of the final district are transferred
to adjacent districts. If PDn < PD−, then the opponent-favouring territorial units in other
districts and adjacent to the final district will be transferred to the final district.
Example executions are shown in Figure 5 and a flow chart illustrating the steps of this
algorithm is presented in Figure 6. Specifically, we show the output of our implemen-
tation of the algorithm of Friedman & Holden [2008], as described above, partitioning
a 21× 21 lattice territory into 5 districts for benchmark models #1 and #4 (defined in
Table 1). The intensity of the colour indicates the partisan extremity of a given territorial
unit and the black lines indicate divides between districts. The left most panel illustrates
the whole territories, whilst the panels to the right show, in order, the composition of
Districts 1 to 5 in order of construction. Observe that the district compositions output by
this algorithm are all typically disconnected, and this shall be quantified through Monte
Carlo studies shortly.
B. Impact of Friedman and Holden Packing Method
Before examining whether the districts constructed emulating the Friedman and Holden
method are connected we shall first look to quantify what degree of advantage this ger-
rymandering procedure gives to the proponent by comparing to a non-partisan model
of districting. To assess the impact of gerrymandering we construct a voter model on a
21×21 lattice territory S where the population distribution is quasi-Gaussian as in Sec-
tion I.B, the source points follow the benchmarks of Table 1, and the total population3 is
fixed to be PS≈ 4700 (up to 0.5% fluctuations). Since the walker function introduces ran-
dom fluctuation in the approximately Gaussian population distribution, each run returns
a different redistricting. Thus we can assess the impact of gerrymandering for a given set
of source points via a Monte Carlo approach using multiple runs of the algorithm.
3The typical population of U.S. congressional districts is 700,000; our results can be rescaled accordingly if desired.
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Sample Executions for Friedman-Holden Packing
Figure 5. : Example districting results for benchmark model #1 (top) & #4 (bottom) of
Table 1 with a Gaussian population distribution and a balanced vote. The gerrymander’s
party is coloured red, and in both cases wins the popular vote in three of the five districts.
Figure 6. : Flow chart of our implementation of the Friedman-Holden method.
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Figure 7. : A fair symmetric
districting of a 21×21 lattice.
Specifically, we generate a set of distinct redis-
tricting plans on 30 different 21×21 lattice pop-
ulation models with balanced votes NS ≈ 0 for
each of the four benchmark source point place-
ments (as shown in Figures 3 & 4), and partition
the territory into five districts (i.e. take n = 5).
For each district Dk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ 5, we calculate
the average district vote NDk and population PDk ,
and the average number of district wins for the
proponent #win. In Table 2 we show the average
net vote NDk in each district (where the districts
are enumerated by order of construction) follow-
ing redistricting via FH packing and averaging
over 30 runs:
Model PD1 ND1 PD2 ND2 PD3 ND3 PD4 ND4 PD5 ND5 #win
#1 902 43.7 970 5.8 978 1.5 946 -34.6 910 -16.3 3
#2 898 60.6 903 16.0 955 9.5 950 -27.2 1001 58.8 3
#3 897 82.1 899 37.2 906 29.4 950 -21.6 1059 -127.1 3
#4 901 83.6 898 15.4 939 9.8 945 69.6 1022 39.8 3
Table 2—: Average net vote per district following redistricting via the FH method.
It is insightful to compare these results to some “fair” partitions of the population.
Since the population approximates a two dimensional Gaussian distribution, any spheri-
cally symmetric partition of the population which does not take into account the voter dis-
tribution can be considered a non-partisan districting. We shall construct a non-partisan
n = 5 districting by allocating the central cells to District 1 and then symmetrically par-
titioning the set of territorial units not assigned to District 1 to create Districts 2-5.
We choose to partition Districts 2-5 by simply drawing the district lines along the
horizontal and vertical mid axes, and assigning the territorial units on the borders to the
adjacent district in the clockwise direction. The size of District 1 is fixed such that the
5 territories have approximately equal populations, thus it is determined by the Gaussian
spread and population threshold t. The resulting districts are illustrated in Figure 7.
To assess the impact of gerrymandering we compare predicted results for the case of
aggressively gerrymandered districts (as determined by our algorithmic implementation
of the FH packing strategy) to the vote for the symmetric districts outlined above for
balanced territories. Generating 30 population distributions on S, we calculate both the
average net vote per district NDk , and the average number of district wins for the propo-
nent #win, as shown in Table 3.
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Model ND1 ND2 ND3 ND4 ND5 #win
#1 0.1 35.1 31.5 -31.5 -35.1 2.44
#2 -0.1 153.6 124.0 -124.1 -153.5 2.56
#3 -0.1 -311.1 49.3 -49.0 310.8 2.46
#4 0.0 -45.2 44.8 44.6 -44.9 2.42
Table 3—: Average net vote per district for idealized non-partisan symmetric districts.
Through the comparison of Tables 2 & 3 it is clear that FH packing significantly im-
pacts the electoral outcome, skewing the predicted number of district wins #win in favour
of the proponent party. However, as we show next, the districts constructed via FH pack-
ing are generically disconnected and therefore typically legally prohibited.
C. Connectivity of Friedman and Holden Districts
Since the Friedman-Holden method includes no spatial data, one might expect discon-
nected districts. In what follows we shall quantify the failure of the FH packing method
to produce connected (and thus legal) districts. To this end we shall take the districts
constructed in Table 2, output the assignments of the territorial units, and identifying the
number of connected components in each district.
To show that the districts constructed via FH packing are highly disconnected we take
the outputs of the 30 runs of FH packing on S generated previously and calculate the
mean number of connected components for each district (labelled D1 to D5) and the
mean over all districts for the 4 benchmark source point models. The results are displayed
in Table 4 and Figure 5 shows one (of the 30) district composition output by the algorithm
for each benchmark model, where one can see that the districts are highly disconnected.
Model D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 Average
#1 2.4 4.9 8.7 1.1 1.4 3.7
#2 2.0 8.7 9.0 9.1 1.0 6.0
#3 4.0 18.2 14.4 12.5 1.0 10.2
#4 4.0 16.6 24.1 26.1 6.9 15.5
Table 4—: Number of connected components for districts created by our algorithmic
implementation of the FH packing strategy.
Under the above settings we find the strategy of Friedman & Holden [2008] typically
outputs districts with O(10) components. Importantly, disconnected districts are legally
prohibited. Thus, while the Friedman-Holden method is simple and easy to implement,
it is too simplistic to give a realistic model of redistricting and makes it clear that it is
critical that algorithmic approaches take into account the spatial distribution of voters.
We note also that Puppe & Tasnadi [2009] have given complementary arguments against
ignoring spatial data whilst gerrymandering from an axiomatic perspective.
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III. Packing with Spatial Restriction
We dedicate this section to introducing two novel algorithms that gerrymander voter
distributions on a lattice in a manner that strongly favours the proponent and gives mostly
connected districts: “Spatially Restricted Friedman-Holden” (SRFH) Packing and “Satu-
ration” Packing. In SRFH packing the gerrymander aims to guarantee wins in the major-
ity of districts, but lose the later constructed (moderate) districts, whereas the saturation
strategy relies on constructing districts to be discarded with significant opponent biases.
In Section IV we introduce one further new strategy based on genetic algorithms. Python
codes for each of our algorithms are provided online.
A. Spatially Restricted Friedman-Holden Packing
We shall introduce here the Spatially Restricted Friedman-Holden (SRFH) Packing
algorithm, which is a modification to the FH packing approach that allows the inclusion
of spatial data. The SRFH districting algorithm forms each district by first including the
strongest opponent and proponent unassigned units, as well as a path of territorial units
between them (which necessarily includes moderate voters). The algorithm then suc-
cessively adds highly polarized units of both parties which are adjacent to the forming
district, until it satisfies the population requirement and the net vote favours the propo-
nent party, i.e. until the district satisfies eq. (9) and eq. (10).
We first discuss the general construction of districts, with the exception of the final
district. Suppose there are x unassigned territorial units, then similar to the FH algorithm
the first step is to sort, via quicksort, the unassigned units in order of decreasing net
vote vi, j and relabel the ordered set {Tˆ1, Tˆ2 · · · Tˆx}. To form a new district the algorithm
includes the unassigned units Tˆ1 and Tˆx in the district and the shortest path between them
that avoids all already assigned territorial units, as illustrated in Figure 8. We use a
standard Grassfire algorithm Bium [1964] to remove assigned units when determining
the shortest path. If a given path between Tˆ1 and Tˆx exceeds the target population PD±,
then the next shortest path can be selected instead, however this is typically not an issue.
While PDk < PD− the algorithm will repeatedly add to the district the most extreme
territorial unit that is unassigned and adjacent to it. If the net vote of the district does
not sufficiently favour the proponent party, as determined by a vote threshold parameter
w, then the algorithm will successively add proponent units to the district. Once the net
vote favours the proponent, the algorithm adds opponent units to balance the vote. After
adding each unit to a given district, the algorithm calculates the current district population
PD and fixes the district when PD > PD−. It then checks that PD < PD+, if this check fails,
the most recent territorial unit added is replaced with an alternative adjacent unit, until
the above is satisfied. After a connected set is validated as a district, the algorithm recurs
on the remaining sorted list of territorial units to create another district. The algorithm
will typically produce districts in order of decreasing NDk , with the proponent vote being
stronger than the opponent vote. The remaining unassigned units after the construction
of n− 1 districts are assigned to the final district, and thus the last district is typically
disconnected. Figure 10 provides a flow chart illustrating the steps of this algorithm. We
will quantify the typically number of connected components in Section III.C.
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Figure 8. : Left: An example of the most extreme proponent and opponent units. Centre:
the shortest path through unassigned territory between the extreme endpoints. Right: the
set of territorial units (orange) considered for addition to the district.
B. A Saturation Packing Algorithm
In what follows we shall introduce an alternative packing algorithm, we call the Satura-
tion Packing algorithm, which implements the classic strategy of simply packing extreme
opponent voters into a single compact district. The Saturation Packing algorithm builds
on the establish algorithmic framework of the SRFH Packing method, however prior to
constructing any districts, each territorial unit is assigned a priority value based on its
net vote and its average distance from proponent source points.
DEFINITION 12: For a territory S with α proponent source points E1, . . . ,Eα , we de-
fine the priority zi, j of a territorial unit Ti, j to be
(11) zi, j :=−vi, j · 1α
α
∑
i=1
d (Ei,Ti, j) .
Once all priorities are assigned, the list of territorial units is sorted in order of decreas-
ing priority and the territorial unit with the greatest negative priority at the beginning of
the sorted list is added to the collection D1, that will eventually form the first district.
Then, the algorithm searches over all territorial units adjacent to D1 and adds the next
highest negative priority unit to D1. This last process is repeated until PD1 > PD−. After
District 1 is constructed via the Saturation Packing algorithm, all subsequent districts are
created using the SRFH Packing algorithm outlined in the previous section. A flow chat
for this algorithm can be seen in Figure 12.
C. Example Executions of Saturation Packing and Friedman-Holden Packing
In Section V we will use the two algorithms developed in this section to undertake
Monte Carlo studies of aspects of gerrymandering. First, however, it is insightful to
consider a number of individual examples, and in particular to view the typical districts
which each algorithm produces for a given voter distribution, analogous to Figure 5.
Figures 9 and 11 present example outputs of, respectively, the SRFH Packing and Satu-
ration Packing strategies in which we partition a 21×21 lattice into five districts for the
benchmark voter models #1 and #4 of Table 1.
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Sample Executions for Spatially Restricted Friedman-Holden Packing
Figure 9. : The Spatially Restricted Friedman-Holden Packing algorithm applied to
benchmark voter model #1 (top) & model #4 (bottom) of Table 1, analogous to Figure 5,
in both red wins 3 districts.
Figure 10. : Flow chat of Spatial Restricted Friedman-Holden Packing of Section III.A.
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Sample Executions for Saturation Packing
Figure 11. : Saturation Packing applied to the benchmark voter model #1 (top) and model
#4 (bottom) of Table 1, analogous to Figures 5 & 9, in both red wins 4 districts.
Figure 12. : Flow chat of Saturation Packing detailed in Section III.B.
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Observe that, by design, with the exception of District 5 the districts created are con-
nected, which is a notable improvement on the original strategy of Friedman & Holden
[2008] which typically produced an average of O(10) component for each district. Fol-
lowing similar methodology to Table 4 with 30 trails, in Table 5 we quantify the number
of connected component in the final district (“D5 #”) for the Saturation Packing and
SRFH-Packing, as well as stating the average number of connected components for all
districts (“average”) to allow comparison with Table 4.
Model SRFH: D5 # SRFH: average Saturation: D5 # Saturation: average
#1 3.6 1.5 2.8 1.4
#2 4.4 1.7 4 1.6
#3 5.7 1.9 6.0 2.0
#4 8.2 2.4 3.9 1.6
Average 5.5 1.9 4.2 1.7
Table 5—: Average number of connected components for District 5, and average number
of connected components over all five districts, for the Saturation and SRFH algorithms.
As shown in Section II.C using the basic FH Packing method, which does not account
for the spatial distribution of voters, the average number of connected components is
O(10) components (cf. Table 4), whereas for our algorithms with spatial restrictions the
average is O(1). With so few components one can potentially achieve connectivity in
post-processing with a small number of swaps. Moreover, in a real world environment
one could also possibly exploit geographical features or utilize the empty area external
to territory to arrange for the final district to be connected. Studies on the effectiveness
of these different districting strategies shall be presented in Section V.
IV. Genetic Gerrymandering Algorithm
In Section III we advanced on the basic strategy of Friedman & Holden [2008] by
including spatial restrictions through what we called the Saturation and SRFH packing
algorithms. However, those methods both rely on assigning territorial units to districts in
manner that satisfies local requirements without reference to the global assignments and
thus typically the final districts are disconnected. Whilst one can potentially ‘fix’ the final
district following the completion of the algorithm, this is somewhat unsatisfactory. In
order to resolve this issue that the final district remains disconnected, we introduce here
a new class of gerrymandering algorithm which we call Genetic Gerrymandering (GG),
based on the general ideas of genetic algorithm approaches. Rather than constructing
districts by selecting particular territorial units, this genetic algorithm takes a starting
configuration of districts and evolves it over a number of iterations towards some goal.
From some arbitrary initial ‘seed’ set of districts the algorithm generates a number of
mildly altered variants (mutations), it then calculates a fitness index for each of the sets
of districts and retains the district sets with the highest index values, before repeating the
process. After several iterations the system converges on a particular outcome.
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One distinct benefit of this procedure is that since the initial seed is a set of connected
districts, provided that connectivity is respected in subsequent mutations, then the final
set of gerrymandered districts will also be connected. To our knowledge genetic algo-
rithms have not been applied to the question of how to optimally gerrymander a territory
to provide highly partisan outcomes. There has, however, been a good deal of work on
implementing fair districting using genetic algorithms, e.g. [Forman & Yue, 2003; Bacao
et al., 2005; Chou et al., 2007; Altman & McDonald, 2011; Vanneschi et al., 2017].
A. The Gerrymandering Index
In order to gerrymander the districts, one needs to construct a fitness index which
favours the proponent party. Although there is no unique way to construct this index, any
good fitness index for gerrymandering should take into account the number of districts
which are winnable for the gerrymanders’ party and the population spread. The latter is
taken into consideration to ensure that the districts have approximately equal populations,
in order to make the districts legally valid. The fitness function we construct depends on
these two qualities and it allows the algorithm to skew the populations if it provides an
advantage to the proponent party.
Let W be the number of districts which are winnable by the proponent, given by the
number of districts with ND > w, plus half the contended districts (those with |ND|< w)
(12) W =∑
i
[
Θ(NDk −w)+
1
2
(
∑
i
Θ(NDk)−∑
i
Θ(NDk −w)
)]
,
where Θ is the Heaviside Θ function. We also define the following population measure
(13) g :=
1
PS
(
max
1≤i≤n
(PDk)− min1≤i≤n(PDk)
)
.
The quantity W and the measure g characterize the salient properties of a given district
plan for the purposes of gerrymandering, and using these we define the following gerry-
mandering fitness index, given by the ratio of districts won minus the population spread:
(14) G :=
W
n
−g ,
The index G takes values in the interval [0,1], with the most desirable outcome for the
gerrymanderer occurring for those sets of districts with the highest fitness index.
This index G we consider is fairly simple, defined by just two parameters, and one
could certainly construct more elaborate indexes, but this simple form is sufficient to
explore the prospects of gerrymandering a given territory. However, identifying highly
effective indexes for gerrymandering would be an interesting question for future work.
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B. Random Seed
Having quantified which sets of districts are preferred through the gerrymandering in-
dex G, the other components of the genetic algorithm are the definition of a set of seed
districts for the genetic gerrymandering algorithm, being a random starting configura-
tions of districts, and the mutation procedure which generates the iterations.
Our starting point for the genetic gerrymandering algorithm is an arbitrary partition
of the territory into n connected districts which is referred to as the seed. We construct
this random seed as follows: for a partition of the territories into n districts we randomly
select n territorial units, label these T˜β for β = 1, · · ·n, and perform a flood fill [Smith,
1979; Glassner, 2013] around these units. Via the flood fill algorithm each of the terri-
torial units Tk ∈ S is assigned to the nearest unit in {T˜i}, calculated using the distance
function defined in eq. (3). The districts in the seed are defined as follows
(15) Dk := {Tk ∈ S | d(Tk− T˜i)≤ d(Tj− T˜k) for i 6= j} (i = 1, · · ·n) .
One should note that via this definition of Dk equidistant points would not be assigned to
a district. This is a minor technicality and in the algorithmic definition these unassigned
units are simply assigned to the set carrying the lowest numerical label i.
The flood-fill random districting guarantees connected districts that are typically con-
vex and compact. Although this method does not enforce population equality, the ran-
dom districtings start out highly equitable from a geometric standpoint, and the district
populations tend to balance out as they evolve due to the definition of the index G.
C. Mutation Procedure
The final component of the genetic gerrymandering algorithm is to randomly alter the
districts, identify the mutated district which maximizes G, and iterate this procedure. Our
mutation procedure swaps certain units between adjacent districts on each iteration in a
manner that preserves connectedness of each district and favours balanced populations.
DEFINITION 13: For a territorial unit T in district D, a district D′ (for D 6=D′) is said
to be an adjacent district to T if there exists a T ′ ∈ D′ which is an adjacent unit to T .
To describe a territorial units propensity to switch to a different adjacent district during
the mutation procedure we define the following
DEFINITION 14: The instability Li, j of a territorial unit Ti, j in district D is zero if
D−Ti, j is not connected. Otherwise, Li, j :=max(PD−PD′) over all districts D′ adjacent
to Ti, j.
From the above definition, if a given territorial unit Ti, j lies in the same district as each
of its adjacent territorial unit, then Li, j = 0 and Li, j 6= 0 occurs only for territorial units
on a border between districts. To implement the mutation process, we first determine the
instability Li, j for each Ti, j ∈ S and we define M := max[Li, j] over all Ti, j ∈ S.
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For all Ti, j ∈ S with Li, j > 0, a mutation on T is performed with probability Li, j/M, re-
moving Ti, j from its old district and adding Ti, j to the lowest-population district adjacent
to Ti, j. This transfer of territorial units will always make the district populations more
balanced and thus the voting districts become significantly more equitable rather quickly
(in just a few generations).
In summary, a set of N seed districts forms generation 1 and our algorithm then
performs the following iterative procedure for generation i: it identifies the
√
N cases
(rounding appropriately) with the highest G indices and to these
√
N cases it applies the
mutation procedure
√
N times. Because of the probabilistic nature of the mutations this
produces N different offspring, which comprise generation i+ 1. With each iteration
the set of districts evolve towards a local maximum of G. After a preset set number of
iterations the algorithm outputs the set of districts with the best G index from the final
generation. Typically, after O(10) iterations the algorithm converges to sets with G' 1.
We provide a flow chart illustration of this algorithm in Figure 14.
D. Sample Executions of Genetic Gerrymandering
For our example run we construct N = 100 random seed districtings for the first gen-
eration and the algorithm selects the 10 with highest G index to mutate. At each stage
the algorithm runs the mutation method 10 times on each parent, producing 10 ·10= 100
offspring. This evolution is iterated over 30 generations, and the final districting output is
the set in the last generation with the highest G index. In Figure 13 we present a sample
executions of the genetic gerrymandering algorithm applied to the benchmark models #1
and #4 of Table 1, in analogy to Figures 5, 9 & 11.
E. Modified GG for Fair Redistricting
Before closing this section we highlight that the genetic gerrymandering algorithm
developed above can be adapted to construct fair districtings simply by changing the
fitness index. As mentioned above, the use of genetic algorithms to fair districting has
been previously studied in the literature, for instance [Forman & Yue, 2003; Bacao et al.,
2005; Chou et al., 2007; Altman & McDonald, 2011; Vanneschi et al., 2017] and, indeed,
many of the existing algorithms for fair districting are far more sophisticated than the one
we discuss below. However, the genetic heuristic and mutation procedure developed in
our genetic gerrymandering algorithm is distinct and original, and it is interesting that,
at least in our simplified lattice models, fair districts can be readily constructed from the
simple and intuitive criteria we stipulate below.
While fairness is a subjective concept, one can construct a reasonable fitness index via
a heuristic formula that takes into account:
i) The district population balance;
ii) Accuracy of state representation in Congress;
iii) Representation accuracy in each district.
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Sample Executions for Genetic Gerrymandering
Figure 13. : Genetic Gerrymandering applied to benchmark model #1 (top) and model
#4 (bottom) of Table 1, analogous to Figures 5, 9 & 11, in both red wins 3 districts.
Figure 14. : Flow chat of Genetic Gerrymandering algorithm of Section IV.
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We quantify these three characteristics, respectively, via fitness functions fP, fS, fD:
(16)
fP := 1−g,
fS := 1−
∣∣∣∣12
(
1+
NS
PS
)
−W
n
∣∣∣∣ ,
fD :=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
QDk
PDk
,
where W and g are defined in eq. (12) & (13), and we denote by QD a measure of the
proportion of the population in a given district D = ∪(i, j)∈ITi, j (for an index set I) whose
vote preference vi, j aligns with the net district vote ND, defined by:
(17) QD := ∑
(i, j)∈I
Pi, j · 12 (1+ sign[vi, j] · sign[ND]) .
Note also that whereas g measured the population spread, here fP characterises the pop-
ulation balance.
Using the partial fitness functions, we define the overall “fair” fitness F to be
(18) F :=
2
5
(
fP+ fS+ fD− 12
)
,
whose values lie in the interval [0,1]. Districts that are deemed “fairest” should have
the highest fitness index. Typically for our trails we have found that the final set of fair
districts tends to have fitness index values in excess of F > 0.9.
Figure 15. : Construction of 7 fair districts via the Modified GG for Fair Redistricting
applied to a 21×21 territory with balanced vote and two source points (with placement
as in model #1 of Table 1). Presentation is analogous to Figure 5.
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We will refer to the Genetic Gerrymandering (GG) algorithm equipped with the in-
dex F (rather than G) as the “Modified-GG for Fair Redistricting”. Following the same
methodology of Section IV.D we execute an example run using N = 100 seed configu-
rations and taking 30 iterations. The results of this example run are shown in Figure 15
for seven districts. In particular, by design, the equitable district configurations produced
by the Modified GG for Fair Redistricting support a 50%−50% vote split for balanced
territories, accurately representing voter preference across the whole territory. Moreover,
a majority of the districts avoid including oppositely polarized voters, ensuring that each
elected district representative reflects the values of their constituents.
V. Results
Through the algorithms developed here we shall quantify some general statements
about gerrymandering. To this purpose, we consider the subdivision of a 21×21 lattice
S into n = 5 districts, with population PS ≈ 4700 and voter distributions as in Table 1.
The population and vote thresholds are fixed to be t = 0.05×PS/n and w= 5 in all cases.
Due to the inherent randomness built into the population distribution we can use the
districts output by the redistricting algorithms with spatial restrictions, developed in Sec-
tion III & IV, to study aspects of gerrymandering via a Monte Carlo approach. Specifi-
cally, we generate a large sets of gerrymandered territory for the case of five districts and
undertake a statistical analysis to quantify the advantage which gerrymandering brings
to the proponent party and other characteristics of gerrymandered territories.
Whilst Monte Carlo methods have been previously employed for detection of gerry-
mandering, for instance [Herschlag, 2018; Herschlag et al., 2017], and also towards con-
structing fair districts, e.g. [Fifield et al., 2015], to our knowledge this is the first study
to apply a Monte Carlo approach to look to quantify general features of gerrymandering.
A. Quantitative Impact of Different Gerrymandering Strategies.
The primary aim of the gerrymanderer is to maximize the predicted number of districts
won #win during an election. The secondary aims are to construct proponent districts
with ND  0 and to arrange for opponent districts with ND ≈ 0, such that the districts
constructed are secure from potential swings in the voting preferences against them, and
can capitalize on swings in their favour to pick up additional districts.
To assess the impact of gerrymandering we compare predicted election results for
each of the gerrymandering algorithms developed above to the non-partisan symmetric
districting model outlined in Section II.B and illustrated in Figure 7. The predicted
election results of the symmetric districting model are given in Table 3. Taking first
the SRFH Packing algorithm, and following a similar methodology to Section II.B, we
generate 30 population distributions on S and calculate the average net vote per district
NDk and the average number of district wins for the proponent (#win):
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Model ND1 ND2 ND3 ND4 ND5 #win
#1 13.8 5.9 3.5 -6.3 -16.6 3
#2 15.8 7.2 5.7 -14.8 -14.2 3
#3 12.6 13.2 9.7 -2.4 -31.6 3.2
#4 24.9 26.0 5.9 -0.2 -45.7 2.8
Table 6—: Average district vote after SRFH Packing of Section III.A.
SRFH-packing is most effective when oppositely extreme voters are situated in close
proximity to one another. This approach handles the voter distribution of model #4 no-
tably less well (as can be seen from the fact that #win < 3) and although favouring the
proponent party, the opponent takes the majority of districts in 30% of trials.
In the case of gerrymandering via Saturation packing we find that, although blunt, it
can be extremely effective in securing districts for territories with a balanced vote:
Model ND1 ND2 ND3 ND4 ND5 #win
#1 -187 136 32 11 8 4
#2 -338 219 45 25 48 4
#3 -438 65 207 63 102 4
#4 -222 11 128 15 68 4
Table 7—: Average district vote after Saturation Packing of Section III.B.
Finally, we consider applications of the Genetic Gerrymandering algorithm, after each
run we label the districts in order of net vote (prior to calculating the district averages):
Model ND1 ND2 ND3 ND4 ND5 #win
#1 36.9 12.3 0.8 -12.1 -37.5 2.7
#2 117 57 16 -54 -137 2.7
#3 232 116 -4 113 232 2.5
#4 130 53 5 -59 -119 2.5
Table 8—: Average district vote after Genetic Gerrymandering algorithm of Section IV.
Since in each case above, the territorial vote is close to balanced, NS ≈ 0, in a fair
election the expected average number of proponent districts wins is #win ≈ 2.5. This is
seen to be the case in Table 3 for symmetric districting with symmetric sources. However,
as anticipated, for the gerrymandered districts generated by our algorithms one observes
clear skews in favour of the proponent. Specifically, SFRH Packing (Table 6) leads to
the proponent always winning 60% of districts and Saturation Packing (Table 7) results
in an impressive 80% of district wins for the proponent . Genetic Gerrymandering (Table
8) is less effective but still can provide a proponent advantage for voter models with only
two source points.
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B. Compactness Tests
One of the most identifiable traits of gerrymandering is that it typically leads to highly
non-convex or non-compact districts. Motivated by this common trait, researchers [Roeck,
1961; Schwartzberg, 1966; Oxtoby, 1977; Young, 1988; Niemi et al., 1990; Polsby &
Popper, 1991; Chambers & Miller, 2010; Hodge et al., 2010] have proposed geometric
measures that can potentially be used to identify gerrymandering. It should be noted that
simple geometric tests, while intuitive, do have certain drawbacks. For instance, they
often do not account for variations in district boundaries due to natural or legal borders
(e.g. coastlines or national borders) and do not incorporate information on population
distributions or demographics. Regardless, it is interesting to calculate these geometric
measures for the gerrymandered districts arising in our work, in order to ascertain which
index values likely indicate aggressive gerrymandering.
We shall examine the most intuitive dimensionless gerrymandering measure: the isoperi-
metric quotient index [Polsby & Popper, 1991], defined as
(19) ID :=
4piA
P2
,
for a district D of area A and perimeter P. The index is normalized to the circle, and
deviations of a district from a circle give ID < 1. In Table 9 we give the average ID for
each district produced via Genetic Gerrymandering (labelling districts in ascending ND
after each run) as well as the mean ID for all districts averaged over 30 runs.
Model ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 ID5 Iaverage
#1 0.5 0.46 0.35 0.40 0.42 0.43
#2 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.48 0.41
#3 0.45 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.5 0.42
#4 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.46 0.41
Table 9—: Isoperimetric quotient of districts produced by genetic gerrymandering.
In order to demonstrate that the districts generated by the Genetic Gerrymandering
algorithm could potentially be detected and constrained by isometric quotient tests, we
compare the ID values of Table 9 to the isometric quotients calculated for the idealized
non-partisan symmetric districts of Section II.B, these are given in Table 10.
Model ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 ID5 Iaverage
#1 - #4 0.40 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.65
Table 10—: Isoperimetric quotient indices for idealized non-partisan symmetric districts
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Since the idealized non-partisan symmetric districts follow simple geometric construc-
tion rules, without reference to the voter distribution, the same ID value is found for
models #1 - #4 (up to negligible fluctuations in the population distribution).
From the above analysis we find that our gerrymandering method always leads to
an average ID which is much lower (around 33%) than the symmetric ‘fair’ districts.
Moreover, some of the gerrymandered districts have very low ID values, for instance
the average value for District 3 of model 1 was I(#1)D3 ≈ 0.35, which is less than half the
isoperimetric quotient of the typical symmetric district with ID ≈ 0.71. We conclude that
gerrymandered districts constructed via our Genetic Gerrymandering algorithm typically
lead to highly non-compact districts for realistic distributions of voters.
The implications of our results are that if redistricting were restricted by compact-
ness constraints, then the extent to which one can impact an election would be sig-
nificantly curtailed, and many aggressive gerrymandering methods (in particular our
own) would likely prove to be ineffective. Thus this provides further support for the
need for democratic governments to place some form of compactness requirement on
redistricting schemes, and complements similar arguments and findings presented in
e.g. [Schwartzberg, 1966; Polsby & Popper, 1991; Altman, 1998; Hodge et al., 2010;
Humphreys, 2011; Chou et al., 2014; Bowen, 2014; Chen & Rodden, 2015]
VI. Summary and Conclusions
The assignment of power to the electorate is the fundamental strength of represen-
tative democracies. Political gerrymandering, if left unchecked, threatens to undermine
democratic systems. Since gerrymandering issues can be formulated as well-stated math-
ematical problems, one can develop tools and tests to identify and inhibit such practices.
We have presented a number of tools for studying gerrymandering and used these to
examine central questions to gerrymandering. A lattice model for population distribu-
tions was developed and we proposed several algorithms to partition lattice territories
into gerrymandered, equal-population, connected (or mostly connected) districts. We
used our lattice model to argue that the method of Friedman & Holden [2008] is unreal-
istic since it generally leads to disconnected districts. However, the techniques of pack-
ing and cracking remain central tools for gerrymandering, and we carried these ideas
in constructing our own algorithmic approaches. To this end we developed three novel
gerrymandering algorithms, SRFH Packing, Saturation Packing and Genetic Gerryman-
dering, and example executions of these strategies are shown in Figures 9, 11, & 13.
The probabilistic population fluctuations inherent to our voter models, allowed us to
employ Monte Carlo methods to study the effectiveness of our gerrymandering algo-
rithms. We found that Saturation Packing, the blunt strategy of packing opposition voters
into a small number of districts, provided the most effective manner to secure district for
a balanced vote. Moreover, our Saturation Packing algorithm led to a less fractured final
district than SRFH Packing, with around 25% fewer components. Genetic Gerrymander-
ing was highlighted as our most complete algorithm, since it outputs districts which are
connected with balanced populations as typically required to be legally valid, however
the price for guaranteed connectedness in all districts is a significant reduction in partisan
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advantage for the gerrymander. Indeed, the Genetic Gerrymandering algorithm did not
always assure electoral victory for a balanced vote, but it can tilt the territory in favour of
the proponent for simple voter distributions. These weaker results are likely due to the
genetic algorithm converging prematurely to local optima, and in future work we will
confront this issue to construct more aggressive genetic gerrymandering algorithms.
There are several other extensions of our algorithms which would be interesting to ex-
plore, such as incorporating third-party candidates and nonvoting electors. Furthermore,
our current algorithms assume complete knowledge about the population distribution
and voter preferences, but in reality, a gerrymanderer has imprecise information about
these distributions, which leads to uncertainty in the voter preference distributions. Voter
uncertainty can be implemented by allowing each vi, j to have some probabilistic fluctu-
ations. One might also implement ‘voter shocks’ to model swings in the popular vote by
O(10%) after redistricting is complete, as discussed in Friedman & Holden [2008]. Both
of these extensions directly affect the required vote threshold w, since if w during redis-
tricting is not sufficiently large, the proponent party may lose the election. Additionally,
it would be interesting to extend the work initiated here to a more systematic study of
different population distributions and spreads of partisan bias, in order to identify voter
distributions which may be more vulnerable to gerrymandering.
We used the outputs of our gerrymandering algorithms to empirically demonstrate that
gerrymandering provides a clear advantage for the gerrymanderer’s party, and that the
partisan connected districts output by our algorithms typically fail isoperimetric quo-
tient tests. Notably, while connectivity is legally mandated, compactness is not. Thus
our work adds further support for implementing some legally mandated compactness
requirement for redistricting to inhibit political gerrymandering.
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